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IntroductIon
In the past 50 yr, environmental management has ben-
efited from major advances in decision science. Perhaps 
the most influential concept among these advances is 
adaptive management, the iterative process of modeling, 
hypothesis testing, optimization, acting, and monitoring 
to reduce uncertainty and maximize net benefits (Holling 
1978, Walters 1986). Government agencies, scientists, 
and theoreticians widely agree that adaptive manage-
ment is the best way to manage a biological population 
in cases where the benefit of different actions strongly 
depends on uncertain ecological processes that can be 
learned through observing system changes in response 
to management (Possingham et al. 2001, Stankey et al. 
2005, Nichols and Williams 2006, Walters 2007, Williams 
and Brown 2012, Game et al. 2014).
While managers often do practice some components of 
adaptive management by collecting data and making 
decisions based on their findings, with the exception of a 
few large-scale management programs in fisheries, water-
fowl, forestry, and conservation (e.g., Sainsbury 1988, 
Moore and Conroy 2006, Johnson et al. 2015, Nichols 
et al. 2015), managers rarely use dynamic modeling and 
optimization, and instead use their experience, intuition, 
and best judgment as a substitute for formal system analy-
sis (Johnson and Williams 2015). This is despite the fact 
that many scientists have proposed management plans 
based on quantitative optimization methods, for a variety 
of ecological systems, which in theory offer managers sub-
stantial cost savings and improved environmental out-
comes (e.g., McCarthy et al. 2001, Westphal et al. 2003, 
Gerber et al. 2005, Wilson et al. 2006, Asano et al. 2008, 
Johnson et al. 2011, Martin et al. 2011, Probert et al. 2011, 
Helmstedt et al. 2014, Hughes et al. 2014, Rout et al. 2014).
One potential reason for the resistance to using math-
ematical modeling in management is that it's unclear 
how much modeling and optimization actually improve 
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management outcomes over expert opinion. This is espe-
cially a concern when model-based decisions are calcu-
lated using passive dynamic optimization (Johnson and 
Williams 2015). The defining feature of passive optimiza-
tion is that the method does not consider the value of 
information while solving for the optimal action, mean-
ing that a manager never sacrifices expected gains, given 
current information, in order to learn about the system 
and potentially improve long-term benefits.
When the value of improved system knowledge result-
ing from each action is incorporated explicitly into the 
objective, the optimization is referred to as active adap-
tive management. Passive adaptive management incor-
porates learning based on observations, but active 
adaptive management also values the future benefit of 
knowledge resulting from decisions made in the present. 
Unfortunately, unless a manager is willing to simplify 
their description of the management problem (e.g., 
Hauser and Possingham 2008), active adaptive manage-
ment is often computationally infeasible, and hence 
 passive optimization is the predominant method for solv-
ing management problems (Johnson and Williams 2015).
Humans can possibly use intuition and past experience 
to incorporate the benefit of learning into decision mak-
ing, without the aid of mathematical models. Can 
humans use their flexibility to learn about the system to 
outperform a model-based, passive adaptive manage-
ment program? Unfortunately, it is difficult to answer 
this question because experiments in management are, in 
general, not repeatable. That is, once a manager makes 
a decision based on their expertise, it is usually impossible 
to compare the outcome to how well an alternative deci-
sion, aided by a mathematical model, would have done.
In this study we take a first step towards quantifying 
the economic benefits of using simple dynamic models 
and passive optimization methods to aid environmental 
management decisions, rather than solely relying on 
human judgment. To do this, students in multiple college 
classes played an online game where they managed a 
simulated fishery. The data from each game was saved 
on a server, and therefore we were able to compare 
exactly how model-based decisions would have per-
formed, compared to the students’ performance, for each 
unique instance of the game.
Through an analysis of the users’ harvest decisions 
entered during each instance of the game, not only were 
we able to compare user performance to the performance 
of model-based decisions, but we could also begin to 
understand the strategies students deploy when manag-
ing a population without the aid of a mathematical 
model and compare how their strategies differ from 
those developed using quantitative techniques.
MethodS
Experiments
Students played two online games, accessed using a 
web browser, where they earned points corresponding 
to the profits from managing a simulated herring and a 
simulated Pacific salmon fishery. We describe the experi-
ment for the herring fishery game and then explain how 
the salmon game was different.
The students played the game using their laptops dur-
ing the lecture period of two courses, “Environmental 
Conservation" at Cornell University (123 students) and 
“Principles of Biology" at Ithaca College (60 students), 
and at the “Graduate Student Science Colloquium" at 
Cornell University (15 students). Prior to managing each 
fishery, the students filled out a multiple choice survey 
that asked them their major, educational experience, 
fishing experience, and environmental management 
experience. See Table S1 in the online Supporting 
Information for a copy of the survey.
After the survey, each game showed a page of direc-
tions describing the fish stock's population dynamics. In 
addition, Matthew Holden, the game facilitator, read a 
standardized script aloud to each class, reiterating the 
points listed on the page. This included statements about 
the existence of a fishery carrying capacity, measurement 
error, environmental randomness out of the manager's 
control, and how their performance would be scored. 
See the online Supporting Information for a copy of the 
game directions. Before starting the game, each student 
was randomly assigned a σ between 0 and 0.25, using a 
uniform distribution. Students with high σ experienced 
large random variation in stock biomass unrelated to 
their management actions. Before playing the game the 
students played an eight-turn practice game. This served 
three purposes: (1) they developed experience with the 
fishery, (2) we used the data from the practice game to 
identify students who didn’t understand the directions, 
and (3) it provided a set of “past data" for the models 
and students to use as a basis for making decisions in 
the future.
Before the user entered their first harvest decision in 
the practice game, they were presented with three harvest 
data points, and the resulting biomasses from the deter-
ministic version of the model underlying the simulated 
population dynamics, to give them some context of the 
range of harvest values they could potentially enter. We 
chose to use the deterministic model for this purpose so 
that all users saw the exact same past data before playing 
the game. A description of the models used to simulate 
the biomass data observed during the game is presented 
in Simulated population dynamics.
The game showed the user graphs of harvest, esti-
mated remaining biomass in the fishery, and cumulative 
profit at each time step. See Fig. S1 in the online 
Supporting Information for a picture of the game dis-
play. At the beginning of each turn of the game, the 
user entered an amount of biomass they wanted to har-
vest into a text box, clicked enter, and then the remaining 
biomass, post-harvest, grew according to the models that 
governed the simulated fishery, and the result was dis-
played on the screen numerically. In addition, all plots 
updated, adding the player's harvest choice to the harvest 
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plot, the resulting biomass to the biomass plot, and the 
new accumulated profit to the total profit plot.
The user's score was the discounted net profit accu-
mulated over the game, with a discount rate of 0.03 
and a constant profit of 10 000 dollars per ton (0.907 
megagrams) of biomass caught. In addition, the user 
received a bonus added to their score at the end of the 
game, which was the  discounted profit that would have 
been generated by harvesting all of the remaining bio-
mass left in the fishery after the game was over. The 
bonus provided incentive for users to let fish escape 
harvest on the last turn. Without the bonus, the user's 
score would be highly sensitive to their last harvest deci-
sion. This bonus is explained to the user in the game 
directions (see Fig. S3 in the online Supporting 
Information for a copy of the directions).
After a student completed their last turn, the game 
displayed their score in addition to a leaderboard, which 
included the scores and initials of the top players in the 
class, up to that point in time. The leaderboard provided 
an external incentive to play well. However, the students 
did not receive a course grade or monetary incentives 
based on performance.
Throughout the game, data were stored locally on the 
user's computer using browser cookies. Upon exiting the 
game, these anonymous data were sent to a server, using 
PHP (a server-side programing language for web devel-
opment; Welling and Thomson 2003), and stored in a 
database. These data included the time the user finished 
playing the game, an anonymous user ID number, the 
student's answers to the survey questions, the environ-
mental noise variable σ, total profit (i.e., “points"), and 
their time series of harvest decisions, resulting biomasses, 
realizations of environmental noise, and measurement 
error, and in addition the analogous data from their 
practice game. By recording the environmental noise and 
measurement error values experienced by the user, we 
were able to compare how any strategy (in our case, 
strategies generated by optimization) would have per-
formed playing that user's exact instance of the game.
After playing the unstructured herring game, the stu-
dent was directed via a link to the salmon game. Using 
cookies, the anonymous user ID number from the her-
ring game was saved and recorded along with a unique 
user ID number for the salmon game as well. In the 
salmon game, the fishery population dynamics were age-
structured, so the game directions also included 
 information on the salmon's life cycle, which consisted 
of juvenile (1-yr-old) and immature (2-yr-old) fish sur-
vival and growth and adult fish (3-yr-old) reproduction. 
On each turn of the game, the user entered the biomass 
of adult and immature fish they chose to harvest in two 
side-by-side text boxes. Plots of the student's harvest and 
biomass time-series data were the same as for the herring 
fishery, except now each plot had two curves, one for 
immature fish and one for adult fish. The user could not 
observe or harvest juvenile biomass. See Fig. S2 for a 
picture of the game display in the age-structured game.
The user's score in the age-structured game was similar 
to the unstructured game, except discounted net profit 
was summed over both adult and immature harvest, and 
the bonus was the discounted profit that would have 
been generated by harvesting all of the remaining adult 
biomass for 3 yr after the game was over (it takes 3 yr 
for the recruits at the end of the game to return to be 
harvested as adults).
Another goal of this study was to collaborate with 
instructors to incorporate the game into their curriculum 
to facilitate active learning. Therefore, while the students 
played each version of this game multiple times, for 
pedagogical reasons, students were only asked to try 
their hardest to score the most amount of points possible 
during their first game. After everyone had finished their 
first game, they were allowed to collaborate and experi-
ment, to facilitate students learning the principles of 
conservation biology, and therefore we did not include 
the students’ latter turns in the analysis.
While we never explicitly told the students not to per-
form any modeling, the game facilitator did not observe 
any of the students writing down models on paper or 
using statistical software packages on their computers 
during the experiment.
Simulated population dynamics
The herring fish game was governed by a simple 
unstructured, one-dimensional model, where the man-
ager chooses to harvest ht tons of biomass in year t, and 
the resulting biomass in year t + 1, Bt+ 1, is a nonlinear 
function of the biomass that escaped harvest in year t, 
R(Bt−ht), times a log-normally distributed random 
number, zt, with mean one and SD σ.
(1)
We choose R to be the Beverton-Holt recruitment 
function, to exclude the possibility of complicated cha-
otic and periodic dynamics in the absence of harvest,
(2)
where b1 is recruitment per unit biomass at low densities 
and b2 controls the carrying capacity of the population 
(Jorgensen and Fath 2008).
The student managing the population observes a stock 
biomass of mtBt, in year t, where mt is a log-normally 
distributed random variable with mean one and SD 
0.025. The small random variation in mt represents meas-
urement error in assessing the current fish abundance.
The age-structured fish game is based on the life cycle 
of coho salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch), including three 
independent cohorts that undergo a three-stage life cycle. 
Juvenile fish live in the river and survive and grow into 
small fish that swim downstream to the ocean where 
they mature, and finally swim upstream to spawn and 
die. The manager sets a total catch of h2,t for immature 
Bt+1= ztR(Bt−ht).
R(B)=
b1B
1+b2B
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fish and h3,t for adult fish. Adult fish harvest occurs prior 
to recruitment, giving population dynamics
(3)
where aij is the per unit biomass contribution, from age 
j biomass that escaped harvest, in year t, to age i bio-
mass, in year t+1.
We parameterized the two models by starting with 
rough estimates from the literature and then adjusted 
the values so that the growth rate of our hypothetical 
herring (unstructured) and coho salmon (age-structured) 
populations, at low densities and in the absence of har-
vest, were equal. The reason for using equal growth rates 
is that when comparing a user's scores from the unstruc-
tured and structured population games, we wanted to 
make sure that any observed difference was due to demo-
graphic structure and not due to differences in the abso-
lute growth rate.
The average 3-yr-old coho salmon weighs 8.0 pounds 
(1 pound = 0.45 kg) and the average 2-yr-old salmon 
weighs ∼3.1 pounds (Marr et al. 1944). A typical survival 
probability for Pacific salmon populations is 0.8 in good 
years and 0.28 in bad years (Worden et al. 2010). Hence, 
we fixed a32 = (8 lbs∕3.1 lbs)(0.8 + 0.28)∕2 ≈ 1.4. Coho 
salmon are more productive than herring (Claupea 
harengus) at low densities, hence we chose to lower 
salmon recruitment as much as “believably" possible so 
that the growth rate in our salmon and herring fisheries 
matched. To do this, we assumed the average survival 
probability of juvenile salmon was equal to the estimate 
for bad years. Therefore, with the composite parameter 
of recruitment at low densities estimated in Worden 
et al. (2010) of 60 juveniles per spawner, we let the prod-
uct of maximum recruitment and juvenile survival be 
b1a21 = (0.28) (60recruits/spawner)(spawner/8lbs)(3lbs/
recruit) ≈ 6.6. Because juvenile fish are not harvested or 
observed, the exact value of a21 and b1 are unimportant 
individually, as they only affect the observed immature 
biomass through their product, and therefore we arbi-
trarily let them equal 4.4 and 1.5, respectively, so that 
their product was 6.6.
Our salmon parameters imply that at low density, the 
population will grow by a factor of b1a21a32 = (6.6)(1.4)   = 
9.24 over 3 yr. We therefore set herring maximum popu-
lation growth rate at b1 = 2.1 because 2.1
3 ≈ 9.24. The 
growth rate reported for herring population dynamics 
ranges from 1.4 to 1.8 (Bjørndal and Conrad 1987, 
Nøstbakken and Bjørndal 2003), so while our herring 
growth rate is high, it is not unreasonably so. Carrying 
capacity is arbitrarily set to 5400 tons, which determines 
b2 for both models.
The raw population data used in the game display was 
created by simulating the above dynamics with initial 
conditions of 948 tons of fish in the unstructured game 
and 481, 309, and 183 tons of adult, immature, and 
juvenile fish, respectively, in the age-structured game.
Optimal strategies and statistical analysis
Explicit formulas for the optimal harvest strategy, as 
a function of the parameters, are well known for the 
unstructured model, and presented in Reed (1979). A 
similar optimal harvest rule for the age-structured model 
is given by Holden and Conrad (2015). In both cases 
the optimal harvest rule is a fixed escapement strategy, 
where escapement is the biomass that escapes harvest. 
In other words, the manager leaves a fixed amount of 
fish in the ocean and this fixed amount of fish is called 
the escapement. For the parameters in the game, the 
optimal escapement in the unstructured game is 2049 
tons of fish, and 556 tons of adult fish (and all immature 
fish, i.e., no immature harvest) in the age-structured 
game (see case 1 in Holden and Conrad 2015).
The first goal of the experiments was to compare the 
performance of users to fitted models playing the exact 
same instance of the game. As a control, we compared 
both the fitted models’ and users’ performance to the 
net discounted profit generated by the optimal constant 
escapement rule specified previously (i.e., the optimal 
strategy with the true parameters known).
Because the optimal strategy is a function of the 
parameters, each quantitative model, managing the 
simulated population, needs an estimate of these param-
eters to calculate the optimal harvest policy. During the 
model's first turn of the game, a computer program esti-
mated the parameter values by fitting the model to the 
data generated from the users’ eight-turn practice game. 
It harvests the simulated population by substituting 
these parameter estimates into the equation for optimal 
escapement (i.e., harvests the population down to the 
optimal escapement or avoids harvest altogether if the 
fish stock is already below optimal escapement prior to 
harvest). After observing the stock biomass resulting 
from its previous harvest, the program re-estimates the 
parameters using the practice game data along with this 
new data point. It then harvests using the optimal 
escapement strategy based on the new parameter esti-
mates, and the process is continued until the game is 
over. This process is the classic method of passive adap-
tive management described by Walters (1986).
The parameter estimation for the unstructured game is 
performed by minimizing sum of squared errors between 
the log-transformed recruitment data, log [mt+ 1Bt+ 1], 
and log transformed predicted recruitment under the 
model, log[R(mtBt−ht)], using the function  “lsqcurvefit” 
in  (MATLAB 2010). Note the raw recruitment data is 
generated by simulating the parameterized model 
described in Simulated population dynamics.
For the age-structured game, because juvenile biomass 
is unobservable, the procedure is the same as previously, 
except predicted recruitment is a21R(m3,tB3,t−h3,t) and 
observed recruitment is m2,t+ 2B2,t+ 2. The transition 
B1,t+1= ztR(B3,t−h3,t)
B2,t+1= zta21B1,t
B3,t+1= zta32(B2,t−h2,t),
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between immature and adult biomass is estimated simi-
larly. It should be noted that because the mean of the 
lognormal measurement error is not exactly zero, the 
above regression is slightly biased. However, correcting 
for this small bias did not affect the results presented in 
this study.
We consider fitted models with the same functional 
form (Beverton-Holt recruitment) as the model underlying 
the simulated population dynamics, and in addition mod-
els that incorrectly specify the functional form, discrete 
logistic (May et al. 1976), and Ricker recruitment (Ricker 
1954). For the age-structured game we also considered 
escapement rules based on an unstructured Beverton-Holt 
recruitment model (as in Eq. 1). To estimate the param-
eters for this model, the computer minimizes the sum of 
squared error between the log-transformed aggregate 
biomass data, log[m2,t+ 1B2,t+ 1 + m3,t+ 1B3,t+ 1], and the 
predicted biomass, log[R(m2,tB2,t + m3,tB3,t−h2,t−h3,t)]. 
It then harvests the two age classes in proportion to their 
respective observed biomasses.
To test whether the percent of optimal profit achieved 
by the user was correlated with the answers to the survey 
questions, the standard deviation of environmental sto-
chasticity, and net profit generated during the practice 
game, not including the bonus, we fitted a linear regression 
model, using the function  “lm” in  (R Core Team 2012).
Another goal of the experiments was to analyze what 
strategies the users were deploying and how well different 
strategies performed compared to others. We compared 
the user's behavior to three idealized candidate strategies: 
constant harvest, proportional harvest, and constant 
escapement. Constant harvest means the user enters the 
same harvest at every time step (harvest = β, where β is 
the user's mean harvest). Under a proportional harvest 
strategy the user harvests a constant proportion of the 
biomass (harvest = β· biomass, where β is their harvest 
proportion). Constant escapement, means the user lets 
a constant amount of biomass escape harvest (har-
vest = 0 if  biomass ≤ β, harvest = biomass − β if  bio-
mass > β, where β is the biomass they let escape harvest). 
We fit the three models by calculating the constant har-
vest, constant escapement, and harvest proportion that 
minimized the sum of squared errors between the user's 
observed harvest decision and the predicted harvest 
under each model, using the function  “optimize” in 
(R Core Team 2012). Then, the users were categorized 
into the three strategy classes based on which model fit 
had the lowest sum of squared errors. For the age-struc-
tured game we repeated this analysis on adult harvest 
for simplicity (because exclusive adult harvest is opti-
mal), but the results reported in the following section 
are similar if  total harvest is used instead.
reSultS
Unstructured population game
All human subjects achieved less discounted net profit 
than would be achieved using the optimal constant 
escapement strategy with known parameters (Fig. 1a). 
This was not 100% certain to occur, because the optimal 
FIg. 1. The percentage of the mathematical model's total profit achieved by the user, in the unstructured game, when the 
mathematical model is (a) Beverton-Holt with true parameters, i.e., perfect information (b) Beverton-Holt but with parameters 
estimated from the data, (c) discrete logistic with parameters estimated from the data, and (d) Ricker with parameters estimated 
from the data. For example, a value of 50% means the user generated half the profit the mathematical model did managing the exact 
same instance of the game. A value of 200% means the user generated twice as much profit as the model.
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strategy is only optimal in expectation, and therefore is 
not necessarily the most profitable strategy during a run 
of atypical years. On average, humans scored 65.4% 
of the discounted net profit generated using the optimal 
constant escapement strategy, and only 11.0% of  students 
achieved over 90% of this optimal expected net profit.
Most users performed worse than the escapement 
rules generated from the models with parameters esti-
mated from the historical harvest data (Fig. 1b–d) even 
if the model made incorrect assumptions about the 
underlying recruitment function (Fig. 1c, d).
The only significant predictor of the user's perfor-
mance was their performance in the practice game 
(P < 0.001). Simple linear regression of the user's percent 
optimal profit on practice game score explained 28% of 
the variation in the user's percent of optimal profit 
(R2 = 0.28, see Fig. S6).
When the practice score was removed as a predictor, 
the user's level of study (1st, 2nd, 3rd or 4th year under-
graduate, or PhD student), academic field of study, and 
SD of the observed environmental stochasticity, still did 
not significantly  correlate with the user's performance. 
Two predictors were significant in this model. The five 
students who responded “I am considering a career in 
fisheries management, but have no experience" generated 
more profit than students that responded “I am not con-
sidering a career in fisheries management" (P = 0.033) 
and students in Cornell's “Environmental Conservation" 
course scored significantly higher than the students in 
Ithaca College's “Principles of Biology" course 
(P = 0.041). However, a linear model with just these two 
predictor variables only explained 4% of the variation in 
user performance. It should also be noted that if we group 
the two students who responded that they actually had 
fisheries management experience with those five students 
who indicated a career interest but no experience, the 
answer to the management experience question does not 
significantly correlate with the users’ scores. This suggests 
that the sample size for students who were considering 
careers in fisheries management may be too small to draw 
any meaningful conclusions.
Classifying the students’ harvest strategies into the 
three categories: constant harvest, proportional harvest, 
and constant escapement, people harvested a constant 
proportion (129 users) much more often than allowing 
a constant escapement (30 users) (Fig. 2). Only 39 users 
FIg. 2.  (a–c) An example user's harvest decisions vs. the biomass they observed prior to making those decisions in the 
unstructured game. The black line is the best model fit, which for (a) user 13 is a proportional harvest strategy (PH), for (b) user 120 
is a constant escapement strategy (CE), and for (c) user 138 is a constant harvest strategy (CH). (d) The sum of squared error when 
fitting each user's harvest data, in the unstructured game, to a constant escapement model vs. fitting a proportional harvest model 
on a log-log scale. Points to the right of the 1:1 line represent users whose variation in harvest is better explained by constant 
escapement than proportional harvest. The blue triangle and red circle in (d) correspond to the proportional harvester and constant 
escaper in (a) and (b) respectively.
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were classified as constant harvesters. Many users repeated 
their harvest decision from the previous turn and the 
average user only entered 10 unique harvest values over 
the course of the 21 turn game (Fig. S7 in the Supporting 
Information). All five users who indicated a career interest 
in fisheries management were classified as proportional 
harvesters. Of the two users with actual management 
experience, one was a constant harvester and the other 
was a proportional harvester. The optimal policy type 
(constant escapement) was the only strategy not used by 
students with fisheries interests or experience.
Forty-five percent of students allowed less fish to 
escape harvest, on average, than the optimal value (Fig. 
3a). In other words, 45% of users overfished the popula-
tion while 55% of users underfished the population. If 
we were to re-classify users whose median escapement 
was within q percent of the optimal value as neither 
under nor overfishing, the result that there are roughly 
the same number of over and underfishers holds for all 
q < 70. So while many students harvested suboptimally, 
over and underfishing mistakes were equally likely.
Students who used constant escapement strategies 
(circles in Fig. 3a) were more likely to overfish than to 
underfish. Proportional harvesters (triangles in Fig. 3a) 
both over- and underfished and constant harvesters 
(pluses in Fig. 3a) were much more likely to underfish. 
Note that constant harvesters underfishing makes sense, 
because if they were to drastically overfish during this 
21-turn game, the biomass would eventually decrease to 
the point where their constant harvest would begin to 
crash the fishery, at which point they would have to 
abandon the constant harvest strategy.
When harvest rules generated by the fitted Beverton-
Holt recruitment model performed poorly, this was 
most often due to over rather than underfishing (Fig. 
3b). Poor model performance was due to a combination 
of two reasons: (1) during the practice game the user 
allowed similar amounts of biomass to escape harvest 
on every turn, generating poor data for model fitting, 
and (2) the SD of the environmental noise was high 
(Fig. 4). When both of these conditions are true, the 
data can misrepresent the recruitment function (Fig. 
4b compared to c) and lead to a poor escapement strat-
egy. Despite the poor escapement strategies that some-
times resulted from the fitted models, they still were 
less frequent and generated higher long-term dis-
counted profit than the worst users (compare the low 
points in Fig. 3a to b).
FIg. 3. (a) The profit generated by each user, in the unstructured game, relative to the net profit the optimal strategy with perfect 
information would generate in the corresponding instance of the game, as a function of the median amount of fish the user let escape 
harvest. The red circles, blue triangles, and green pluses are for users who used constant escapement (CE), proportional harvest 
(PH), and constant harvest (CH) strategies, respectively. (b) The analogous proportion of optimal profit generated by the fitted 
model vs. the median of escapements chosen by the model after it fit a recruitment function to the data during each turn of the game. 
The dotted line is optimal escapement under perfect information. 
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In the Supporting Information we show how quickly 
the parameter estimates, during the Beverton-Holt 
model fitting, converged to the true values governing the 
game dynamics. In general, poor model fits were rather 
common. For example, when decisions were made based 
on the Beverton-Holt model with parameters estimated 
from biomass observations during the game, even after 
all 21 turns, the estimated value for b2 was off by more 
than 25% over 40% of the time (see turn 21 in Fig. S8a). 
The estimation of b1 was more accurate (Fig. S8b), and 
for both parameters the poor estimates improved as time 
moved forward (Fig. S8a, b) and as a result so did the 
model's harvest decisions (Fig 5a–c). Still, in many of 
the cases where parameter estimates were off, the fitted 
models led to more profitable decisions than those gener-
ated by the users, despite the poor model fit (Fig. 1b).
The users did not, on average, improve their escape-
ment decisions through time during the 21 turn game. 
For example, as the users advanced through the game, 
the percentage of users who chose an escapement value 
within 50% of the optimal escapement value decreased 
(Fig. 5f). Changing the cut off  from 50% of optimal 
escapement to 10% and 30% did not lead to a positive 
trend between the number of turns completed and the 
percentage of users within the specified percentage of 
the optimal value (Fig. 5d–f). This suggests that while 
students had the opportunity to learn about the system, 
they did not do so in a way that improved their manage-
ment decisions.
Age-structured population game
In the age-structured model, the average user achieved 
63.6% of the optimal profit achieved by a model with 
perfect information. The most profitable user scored 
only 84.3% of the optimal profit, in comparison to the 
best performer in the unstructured population game who 
scored over 95% of optimal profit. On the opposite end 
of the spectrum, the worst users in the unstructured 
population game only scored 7.2% of optimal profit, 
while in the age-structured game the worst user scored 
11.8% of optimal profit. A full distribution of the relative 
performance of the users compared to the optimal policy 
in the age-structured game is given in Fig. 6. The 
improved performance by the worst players, despite the 
age-structured game being more complex, was due to 
the fact that this game includes three independent 
cohorts. Even if one or two cohorts were driven to low 
FIg. 4. (a) The profit generated from the strategies using the fitted Beverton-Holt model relative to the optimal profit under 
perfect information, as a function of the SD in practice game escapement, generated by the user. Dark and light circles are for 
instances of the games with low and high levels of environmental stochasticity respectively. (b–c) The true recruitment function 
(dashed line) and fitted recruitment function (solid line) for two instances of the game, (these examples are highlighted by a red circle 
and blue triangle in (a)), where the fitted model generates unprofitable escapement strategies (b; red circle) and profitable ones 
(c; blue triangle). The open symbols are recruitment data generated by the user in the practice game, whereas the smaller filled points 
are generated by the fitted model when playing the actual game.
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FIg. 5. Percentage of escapement decisions in the unstructured game, by the fitted Beverton-holt model, that were within 
(a) 10%, (b) 30%, and (c) 50% of optimal escapement as a function of the number of turns completed during the game. Percentage 
of users who chose escapement values within (d) 10%, (e) 30%, and (f) 50% of optimal escapement as a function of the number of 
turns completed during the game.
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FIg. 6. The percentage of the mathematical model's total profit achieved by the user, in the age-structured game, when the 
mathematical model is (a) age-structured with true parameters, i.e., perfect information (b) age-structured but with parameters 
estimated from the data, and (c) unstructured with parameters estimated from the aggregated (immature + adult) biomass data. For 
example, a value of 50% means the user generated half the profit the mathematical model did, managing the exact same instance of 
the game. A value of 200% means the user generated twice as much profit as the model.
10
30
50
Perfect
Information
(a)
Fitted,
age structured
100 200 300
(b)
10
30
50
Fitted,
unstructured
100 200 300
(c)
Model profit achieved by users (%)
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
MATTHEW H. HOLDEN AND STEPHEN P. ELLNER Ecological Applications 
Vol. 26, No. 5
1562
levels, some harvest could be achieved in the remaining 
turns as long as one cohort was still abundant. A player 
could make one very bad decision, and learn from it, 
without collapsing the entire fishery.
The user's performance in the age-structured game 
was mainly determined by their overall fishing pressure 
and not their decision of which age class to fish (compare 
Fig. 7a to b). The majority of users harvested more 
immature biomass than adult biomass, despite exclusive 
adult harvest being the optimal strategy (Fig. 7b). 
Similar to the simple unstructured game, users who 
deployed a constant escapement strategy (for adults) 
were more likely to over-fish (Fig. 7a).
The average escapement strategies resulting from the 
age-structure model with parameters estimated from 
historical data (fitted age structure model) achieved 
98.4% of the optimal profit, even better than in the 
unstructured game. Even in the fitted model's lowest 
performing game, it achieved 78.9% of optimal dis-
counted net profit, far better than even the median user. 
This is for two reasons (1) users in the practice game 
tended not to let the same amount of adult fish escape 
harvest every turn, producing good data for model fit-
ting, and (2) the transition rate from immatures to adults 
was always estimated well, because it is a single param-
eter that can be estimated independently from recruit-
ment, whereas the recruitment function requires two 
parameters to be estimated simultaneously. The result 
of point (2) is that the model-based decisions always 
fished from the correct age class.
The average escapement strategy, generated by fitting 
a one-dimensional unstructured population model to the 
aggregate age-structured data, achieved 72.3% of the 
optimal profit. This represents a 13.5% gain in profit 
over the average student operating solely on intuition. 
Only 58 users, out of 172, generated more profit than 
would have been obtained by harvesting based on the 
fitted unstructured model. However, for instances of the 
game where the unstructured model generated low dis-
counted net profit, the model's proposed escapement rule 
crashed the fishery, by letting very little biomass escape 
harvest. These strategies generated less discounted net 
profit than the least profitable users (compare the lowest 
points in Fig. 7a to c).
dIScuSSIon
Many mathematical tools exist to improve decision 
making in environmental management. Yet some man-
agers are still resistant to using these tools to develop 
management plans, and instead often rely on their expe-
rience and intuitive judgment (Johnson and Williams 
2015). It has been shown that humans using intuition 
and judgment create more biased, but not necessarily 
FIg. 7. (a–c) The proportion of optimal profit, in the age-structured game, generated by (a) the user and (c) fitted unstructured 
model, with parameters estimated from the aggregated (immature + adult) biomass data, for each game as a function of the median 
escapement chosen. (b) The proportion of optimal profit generated by the user as a function of the median proportion of harvest 
allocated to adult biomass during the game.
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less accurate, predictions of species extinction risk when 
compared to humans aided by mathematical modeling 
(McCarthy et al. 2004). However, we are unaware 
of any study that compares human judgment and model-
based strategies for developing explicit management 
decisions.
In this study we studied optimal escapement strategies 
for the management of simulated fisheries, developed 
using simplified models of fish stock dynamics, and 
tested their performance compared to students managing 
the simulated population using only their experience and 
judgment. The model-based decisions performed better 
than the students, on average, even when the models 
mis-specified recruitment or state variables. However, in 
the age-structured game, the worst outcomes produced 
by the simplified unstructured model were worse than 
the worst outcomes generated by the users.
Each quantitative model-based approach to managing 
the simulated fishery used a single equation or system 
of equations with unknown parameters. Alternatively, 
a manager could develop a set of candidate models 
 representing alternative hypotheses about the system 
(e.g., an age-structured and unstructured model) and 
then use quantitative methods to resolve structural 
uncertainty (Williams 2001, Nichols et al. 2015). Our 
results on using unstructured models to manage age-
structured populations are an example of a worst case 
scenario where a manager's candidate model set does 
not contain a model that approximates the system well. 
Even in such a case, on average, quantitative methods 
outperformed human judgment in our experiment.
Users and fitted models tended to make different types 
of mistakes. An equal number of users overfished vs. 
underfished the stock. However, when management 
based on fitted models failed, it was almost always due 
to overfishing.
We found no evidence to support the hypothesis that 
users learned about the system in such a way that helped 
them improve their management decisions (Fig. 5d–f). 
Because the subjects were students with little experience 
managing actual populations, it is unclear if experienced 
managers would perform similarly. However, the stu-
dents did gain experience managing the simulated fishery 
through a practice game, and most of the subjects were 
exposed to curriculum in ecological management 
through the course in which the experiment was admin-
istered (concepts such as maximum sustainable yield and 
tragedy of the commons).
Learning did occur in model-based passive adaptive 
management, with many model runs quickly estimating 
the parameters reasonably well. However, even when the 
model was perfectly specified, and only needed param-
eter estimates from the data, it still sometimes performed 
worse than a student using intuition alone, especially 
when environmental stochasticity was high and prior 
management decisions were all similar (Fig. 4).
The lack of data with sufficient variability in stock 
abundance to estimate parameters well may be common 
in fisheries management because overexploited popula-
tions are ubiquitous (Pauly 2008), and therefore the 
time-series data of recent fish stock abundances for many 
species may often contain only population sizes well 
below carrying capacity. In such cases, recruitment 
curves may often be incorrectly estimated such that sim-
ple models will naively suggest that it is optimal to keep 
overfishing. This suggests that passive adaptive manage-
ment, choosing the best strategy based on the current 
knowledge of the system to optimize some objective, 
without any regard to the information gained by deploy-
ing that action, can potentially lead to poor performance 
even when model structure is correctly specified.
Our results suggest that probing the system by perform-
ing an action that is suboptimal given the manager's cur-
rent belief about the system, but that will reveal information 
that improves management in the future, might be desir-
able in such scenarios. Incorporating the economic benefits 
of learning from experimentation explicitly into the opti-
mal decision problem, known as active adaptive manage-
ment, has been studied within the context of harvested 
populations. However, due to computational limitations 
solutions are always limited to cases with one of the three 
following assumptions: (1) both the probability distribu-
tion specifying environmental stochasticity and all param-
eters in the recruitment function are perfectly known, 
except for a single parameter to be estimated from the 
data (Walters 1981, Ludwig and Walters 1982), (2) there 
is a small number of candidate models, with all parameters 
fixed within each model (Williams 2001), or (3) only a 
small number of actions and system states are admissible 
(e.g., action = harvest or not, fishery state = robust, vul-
nerable, or collapsed; Hauser and Possingham 2008). Note, 
though, that the benefit gained from calculating an optimal 
solution using active adaptive management can be small 
depending on the problem (Walters and Green 1997).
Unfortunately, the problem of choosing an optimal 
escapement level in our game, using the principles of 
active adaptive management, is computationally infeasi-
ble given current algorithms and computing power 
because our game allows for an infinite set of possible 
actions and states, governed by multiple unknown param-
eters and unknown variability in environmental noise.
We used a version of passive adaptive management, as 
it was originally described by Walters (1986), to generate 
model-based decisions in this study. This method assumes 
the parameter values estimated from the data were the 
true values governing the dynamics during the optimiza-
tion procedure. Alternatively, it is possible to incorporate 
parameter uncertainty in the optimization step of passive 
adaptive management (Johnson and Williams 2015). 
Correcting for uncertainty could potentially improve the 
model-based decisions in this study, without the need for 
more complicated active adaptive management methods.
It may be concerning that even in the most optimistic 
case, where the underlying dynamic model is known and 
parameters have to be estimated from the data, classic 
passive adaptive management can fail to achieve desirable 
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results. However, letting students manage our simulated 
fishery based solely on their experience and judgment 
typically led to much worse outcomes. Because using 
simple mathematical models along with the most basic 
passive adaptive management techniques usually improved 
management outcomes in our experiment, we would rec-
ommend that modeling be more widely adopted in man-
agement, even when challenges prevent the manager from 
using more complicated, state-of-the-art methods.
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